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Abstract 
The United States, China’s biggest export market, is planning to impose a carbon tariff against countries without 
strict GHG emissions reduction standards, which will necessarily have immense influence on China’s export trade. In 
this dissertation, its background and imposing methods are initially discussed. Impact on China’s export trade volume, 
commodity prices, various industrial sectors, foreign investment manner, corporate operation modes and so forth are 
then analyzed explicitly. Lastly, the paper presents several policy suggestions in allusion to these impacts. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars from various countries have already done some research  on carbon tariffs. Most western 
scholars choose to support the carbon tariff. The Chinese model is based on low wages, so companies 
with a h igh level of cap ital and less labor costs, which place those companies in an economy with high 
energy costs, and introduce a carbon tariff, consequently, the wage advantage disappears, say Benjamin 
Tal, a senior economist at CIBC World Markets, in the paper of The Carbon Tariff. Two Canadian 
economists, Thomas Courchene and John Allan, who write for the Institute for Research on Public 
Policy’s  magazine, Policy Options, stated in the latest issue that “carbon tariffs” offer a solution to the 
inevitable “free rider” problems that will flow from national and local carbon tax regimes. In paper, 
Global Welfare Implications of Daniel Gros, director of the centre for European Policy Studies , presented 
a simple, basic model to compute the welfare consequences of the introduction of a tariff on the CO2 
content of imported goods .  
Till now, in China, this issue has also been extensively discussed, but few concentrate on the 
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influences it will bring to our export trade, though almost all scholars agree its implicat ions will be 
profound and wide-ranging. Hope through this thesis, related departments can make early preparat ions to 
ensure a health development of our economy in the future. 
2. Background and Approach of United States’ Carbon Tariffs 
Carbon tariffs refer to impose special tariffs  of emissions on high energy-consuming products 
(including aluminum, steel, cement, fert ilizer and some chemicals). It will be an equalizing force which 
will tax implicit subsidies on carbon contents of imports from non-compliant countries. 
According to the United States Clean Energy Security Act, the States will make use of border tax 
adjustment mechanis m to affect its import  and export trade. This mechanis m is  that, complying countries, 
when exporting goods to non-signatory countries, will implement export tax rebates  to achieve a fair 
competition. On the other hand, when import occurs, the country will impose a carbon tariff, to guard 
against external threats on domestic goods’ competitiveness.  
Specifically, in  export  trade, the U.S. Clean Energy Security Act  provides, from 2012 to 2025, 
exporters can get free carbon credits issued by the government. Nonetheless, the tax rebate system will 
gradually be abolished between 2025 and 2035. In import trade, the U.S. government imposes carbon 
tariffs through International Emission Reserves Scheme. Section 767 of the United States Clean Energy 
Security Act prescribes the system will start to establish from January 1st, 2018 , and put into effect on 
January 1st, 2020. U.S. will face a serious problem thenüwho should be imposed. According to the plan, 
countries do not play by the same carbon standards will be the targets. While countries which have 
implemented carbon reduction measures in line with the U.S. standards, in other words, both of the two 
are state parties of an international agreement (i.e. a  new agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol) which 
contains enforceable reduction commitments and obligations , at least consistent with the United States . 
Therefore, the carbon tariff will be imposed on imports from countries do not meet these standards.  
3. Carbon Tariffs’ Influence on China’s Export 
3.1 Carbon tariffs’ influence on China's export volume  
The United States is now China's largest export market. According to stat istics from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, in 2009 the Sino-US bilateral trade arrived at 365.98 billion U.S. dollars, 
accounting for 16.58% of its total trade volume, which is $2,207,270,000,000. Among them, U.S. 
exported goods valued 69.58 billion dollars to China while import  commodities with a total value of 
296.4 billion dollars from China. In 2008, China exported 252.3 billion U.S. dollars  goods to America, 
accounting for 17.66% of China’s total annual exports which was $ 1,428,550,000,000. 
Assuming a $45 per ton cost of CO2 in the US marketplace, the tariff would raise some $55 b illion a 
year from Chinese exports to the US, which is also the equivalent of a 17% tariff on total Chinese exports. 
It is almost six times larger than the current 3% tariff rate. According to the World Bank, once 
comprehensively implemented, China could face an average tariff of 26%, and its exports may fell 21%. 
A research of Liu Xiaochuan, a professor of the Shanghai University of Finance shows that if the US 
imposed a carbon tariff of $30/ton of carbon, China’s total export volume will decrease 0.715%, nearly 
1.7% of the export volume to U.S., while  China’s GDP will be dragged down 0.021%. We presume 
carbon tariffs increase to $60/ton, then China’s total exports would  fell 1.244 %, the decline of exports to 
U.S. would increase to 2.6% or more, and GDP will drop 0.037%.  
3.2 Theoretical model of carbon tariffs’ influence on China’s export prices 
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Daniel Gros presented a calculating model of the carbon tariff’s global welfare impact in paperü  
Global Welfare Implications of Carbon Border Taxes. By intercepting and modifying it , we propose a 
model to calcu late carbon tariff's influence on our export prices. This section presents a simple part ial 
equilibrium two -country model to study this problem. The world is divided into two actors: an importing 
country and an exporting country. The basic building blocks of the model are standard, basic utility and 
production functions: 
With the total cost function as usual twice differentiable and convex (TC' and TC'' both strictly 
positive). For simplicity the total (private=social) cost of production is given by: 
 sqTCTC                                                                                                                                 (1) 
Production in importing country is subject to potentially a different technology and cost function. But 
it has the same general property of increasing marginal costs.  ** sqTCTC                                                                                                                                  (2) 
Consumption of the goods in question yields utility which is also twice differentiab le and convex (U'  
strictly positive and U'' strictly negative), given by: 
)( dqUU                                                                                                                                        (3) 
Households from importing country have the same preferences:  ** dqUU                                                                                                                                       (4) 
Individual utility maximization implies that households determine consumption by equating  marginal 
utility to the price they face in the market. Consumers from importing countries  have to pay a price that is 
equal to the international price plus an import tariff. Denoting the international price by p and the import 
tariff by β, this implies (for the individual consumer):  *dqUp c  E                                                                                                                                (5) 
Exporting country consumers don’t face an import tariff. They will set a price equal to marginal utility. 
 dqUP c                                                                                                                                       (6) 
Exporting country producers will set marginal cost equal to the price they face, this implies that: 
)( sqCTp c                                                                                                                                     (7) 
Producers of importing countries  will also set supply to equal marginal cost to the price: 
)( *sqCTP c  E                                                                                                                             (8) 
The only other relationship relevant for the private sector is that global supply has to equal global 
demand for the (possibly composite) good in question. 
**
ddss qqqq                                                                                                                              (9) 
The system of five equations (5) to (9) describes the market equilibrium 
 pd + Ed = U cc˄ *dq ˅ *ddq                                                                                                          (10) 
pd = U cc ( dq ) ddq                                                                                                                          (11) 
pd + Ed = CT cc  ( *sq ) *sdq                                                                                                              (12) 
 pd = CT cc ( sq ) sdq                                                                                                                        (13) 
  *ss dqdq *dd dqdq                                                                                                                 (14) 
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  Ep  CT cc ( *sq )                                                                                                                        (15) 
 
**
ddss qqqq                                                                                                                           (16) 
Based on the above equations, we can deduce the following results: 
))(())(())(())(/[(]))(())([(/ 11*11*1*1*  cccccccccccc ddSssdp qUqUqCTqCTqCTqUdd E
                                                                                                                                                           (17) 
The equation can be simplified as: 
)(/1 dqUu cc   )(/1 sqCTc cc  )/()(/ ** uucccudd p  E = )/()]([ ** uucccu    
Through this model we can conclude, as Edd p /  is negative, so the higher the carbon tariff is, the 
lower market prices will be. Yet, the impact is clearly  partial. Since the absolute value of Edd p /  is less 
than 1, so the influence on prices depends on equation (17). [3] 
3.3 Carbon tariffs’ influence on China's export sectors 
China exports a huge amount of manufactures to America every year, most of which are h igh energy 
consumption and carbon intensive products, for instance, machinery, building materials, chemicals, iron 
and steel products.Carbon tariffs will especially depress exports of those energy-intensive sectors. Data 
from the United Nat ions COMTRADE shows, from 2006 to 2008, energy-intensive products import to 
the U.S. accounted for respectively 14.7%, 16.5% and 17.7% of its total imports. We can take 2008 for an 
example, among all those energy-intensive products, 44.8% of the cement, 32.6% of the iron and steel 
products and 27.3% of the glass products were from China.     
Another important question is which industries will be mostly affected? It is indisputable sectors with 
high capital-to-labor ratios and energy emission intensity will be the first to bear the burnt. Chinese 
exporters of chemical products, with their astronomical energy intensity factor, will be the first to witness 
their businesses migrating back to the States. In fact, chemical exports from China to U.S. are already 
slowing down notably, with shipments  in the past two years rising by only half the pace seen in  the first 
half of the decade. Non-metallic mineral p roducts (cement, glass, lime, etc), with energy intensity 130%  
higher than the Chinese industrial average, along with  printing, p rimary metal manufacturing and 
machinery industries are other candidates for such realignment.  Also based on Liu Xiaochuan’s research, 
carbon tariffs of $30/t will b ring about a decline of 3.65% to glass manufacturing sector outputs, 3.29% to 
the fertilizer sector, while $60/t of carbon tariff will cause outputs of glass manufacturing sector decline 
6.35%, and the fertilizer industry descend 5.89%. However, because of the substitution effects, non-
energy intensive industry products  may even have an increase in output, 0.13% if the tariff is $30/t, and 
0.23% if the tariff increases to $60/t. [4]  
3.4 Carbon tariffs’ influence on China's attraction to foreign investments 
Currently, foreign invested enterprises  have become the main fo rm of China's processing trade. 70% of 
China's current exports to U.S. belong to the processing trade industry. That is because, with economic 
globalization and especially  the strengthened fluid ity of capital element, a  country’s comparative cost 
advantage is no longer exclusive. The American WERNER International Spinning and Weaving 
Authoritative Statistics Bureau carried on an investigation on more than 40 country's text ile industries. 
According to different countries’ artificial expense data of textile industry in 2007, we can see China’s 
low labor costs.  
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Table 2 Artificial Expense Comparison of the Related National Textile Industry (Spins and Weaves) of 2007 
country 
Switzerland Germany England Japan America turkey China Vietnam 
Labor cost/hour(dollar) 33.67 28.17 23.42 22.69 16.92 2.96 0.55 0.46 
Since the proposed carbon tariff system is destination based, it would  ensure that producers located in 
comply ing nations would not suffer any competit ive disadvantage when exporting non-complying nations. 
Confronted with the possible carbon tax, China's labor advantage can be offset to a large extent. From the 
investment aspect, global value chain part icipants  will have to pay customs duties for both intermediate 
and final goods exported from China, which will significantly increase the production cost.  
Meanwhile, mult inational companies will take carbon risks into account when choosing where to 
manufacture. For instance, China has been relying a lot on cheap labor to attract foreign investment, but 
companies engaging in chemical, cement, g lass manufacturing, and other capital-intensive rather than 
labor-intensive industry will likely to choose local manufacturing. That is to say, a carbon tariff imposed 
by U.S. on emissions embodied in Chinese exports would not  only abolish the implicit subsidies on the 
carbon content currently enjoyed by Chinese exports, but also it would be large enough to start reversing 
current trade and off-shoring patterns. And for many energy-intensive industries that joined the exodus to 
the cheap labor markets of East Asia, imposing the carbon tariff means coming home. Wage advantages 
may no longer be as decisive in determining overall competitiveness for energy-intensive industries in 
today’s energy-starved world economy. [5] 
3.5 Carbon tariffs’ influence on Chinese enterprise’s operation manner 
Carbon tariffs mean competit iveness of economies with low efficiency, high energy consumption and 
backward production technique would naturally shrink. Conversely, competit iveness of high-efficient 
economies and their enterprises will strengthen immensely. Facing such grim situation, to survive means 
transition or upgrade.  
Transition refers some Chinese enterprises dealing with high-energy exports, considering the possible 
weakness or even disappearances of their price advantage in overseas market would turn to yield 
commodit ies for home market. This is especially the case for some small or mediu m enterprises lack of 
financial support and advanced management. Even if, they have realized their price advantage is 
disappearing, still unable to  take steps to reduce the GHG emissions. The only thing they can do is 
shifting to the domestic market. Meanwhile, carbon tariff would change relative production costs of 
different sectors, and thus corporate profitability and competitiveness  is affected. Other conditions being 
equal, compared with non-energy intensive industries, energy-intensive production costs will increase and 
its international competitiveness will decline, while non-energy-intensive industries may even see an 
increase in export. Thus, transformation between industries will occur. 
Upgrade indicates, to lessen carbon tariff’s shock and maintain competitiveness, corporations enhance 
their knowledge and management. This especially applies to large enterprises and multinational 
corporations, which are capable of investing and introducing new technology to improve energy 
efficiency while reduce GHG emissions. Hence, carbon tariffs would  let enterprises pay more attention to 
energy saving, phrased differently stimulate enterprises to head for a low-carbon direction. So, carbon 
tariff would be an external force to compel domestic enterprises upgrade constantly, trying hard on 
energy saving and emission reduction. Longer term, carbon tariffs could induce changes in China’s own 
energy and carbon practices. 
4. Policy Suggestions for China's Dealing with Carbon Tariffs 
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While all the above problems will be severe, they are not insurmountable. We should see the 
underlying purposes, more importantly, pose corresponding measures at the same time. 
x Firstly, expand domestic demand to reduce the carbon tariff's impact on the economic development. In 
2007, China’s dependence on export was up to 35.5%, five of our top seven export markets are 
developed countries, which accounted for 35.8% of our total exports. Therefore, the expansion of 
domestic demand is the fundamental countermeasure to deal with carbon tariffs. Confronted with 
various trade protectionism policies, rely ing more on domestic demand will g ive China's economic 
development larger room to maneuver, while enhancing the ability to resist economic risks meanwhile.  
x  Secondly, impose green taxes ahead of the carbon tariff to promote industrial structure changing 
towards low-carbon direction. Carbon tariff’s strike for the export-o riented economy is naturally 
obvious. Hence, China should take the lead in implementation of green taxes to guide industry 
development before the carbon tariff becoming realism. Studies show that green taxes can inhibit  
future energy demand significantly. At present, assuming tax rate of 50 Yuan / ton of standard coal, the 
energy demand will decline 6.13%, about 126 million tons of standard coal energy can be saved; to 
2030, assuming tax rate of 120 Yuan / ton of standard coal, energy demand will drop by 16.2%, then 
about 4 million tones of coal energy can be stinted. [6]  
x  Third ly, climb to the high-end of global value chain to reshapes enterprises’ competitive advantages. 
Chinese corporations must implement high-end climbing on  the global value chain, as its labor 
advantage in the future may be offset to a large extent. To achieve this, advanced equipments and 
technology are ought to be introduced and more technical experts be hired to drive enterprises core 
technology development. Attracting foreign d irect investment is particularly  significant, most of which 
are accompanied by some forms of technology transfer. Consequently, fragmented value segments are 
restructured in China, through which technological progress and industrial upgrading are realized.[7] 
x  Fourthly, use financial tools to achieve a win-win result both for GHG emissions reduction and 
economic development. Green finance, an  innovative macro-economic policy, is protecting the 
ecological environment through financial instruments. Green finance includes green credit, green 
insurance, green securities policy, green venture capital and carbon emissions trading system. To some 
extent, green financial systems can help to solve financial problems for many domestic enterprises, 
especially the SMEs, which were once unable to upgrade even though having a wish to do so. Besides, 
the system can lead large enterprises towards low carbon direction. To avoid  interest rate risk of green 
finance, environmental protection factors will be taken into consideration when enterprises try to 
realize their development.  Green Finance will also encourage enterprises to become the mainstay of 
environmental protection technological innovation, and promote the upgrading of environmental 
protection equipments and technology. [8] 
x Finally, introduce corporate carbon management to help enterprises transfer or upgrade. Carbon 
management is to minimize GHG emissions in production while provide low-carbon goods and 
services. Carbon management must control GHG emissions in the whole cycle, from parts 
procurement, manufacturing, transportation, distribution and consumption, to finally be abandoned . 
Under carbon dioxide regulation and the environment self-action plan, Europe, the United States and 
the Japanese government are try ing to achieve effective management fo r the GHG emissions to 
actualize  their reduction targets. Multinational companies of the three countries have begun requiring 
their suppliers and counterparty to provide the GHG emissions informat ion and developed a series of 
appropriate international standards . GHG emissions information of the entire value chain (carbon 
footprint) will be made clear on the product, which will provide effect ive incentives for firms 
producing internationally traded goods to reduce their carbon footprints. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
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As China's largest export market, carbon tariffs’ influence will no doubt involve all aspects of China's 
export trade, such as: trade volume reduction, export price changes, the decline of high energy 
consumption industries, the decreas ing attractiveness to foreign direct investment, export enterprises 
transformation and upgrading and so on. 
The question that how to deal with the carbon tariffs  has placed in  front of China’s government and 
companies. In short terms, we should argue against this trade protectionist measure through diplomatic 
means and negotiations. In the long run, expansion of domestic demand and the development of low-
carbon economy are the fundamental response to carbon tariffs. 
With China's continuous economic development and rising international status, assuming  the 
responsibility to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases is only a matter o f time. The government, 
corporate and society should work together to help China's economy develop towards a healthier and 
more stable direction. 
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